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Abstract. We develop a nonparametric instrumental variable approach for the estimation
of average treatment effects on hazard rates and conditional survival probabilities, without
model structure. We derive constructive identification proofs for average treatment effects
under noncompliance and dynamic selection, exploiting instrumental variation taking
place during ongoing spells. We derive asymptotic distributions of the corresponding
estimators. This includes a detailed examination of noncompliance in a dynamic context.
In an empirical application, we evaluate the French labor market policy reform PARE
which abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed
unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced additional active labor market
policy measures. The estimated effect of the reform on the survival function of the duration
of unemployment duration is positive and significant. Neglecting selectivity leads to an
underestimation of the effects in absolute terms.
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1. Introduction
In the evaluation of treatment effects on duration outcomes, such as the effect of job
search assistance on unemployment durations, it is often interesting to distinguish effect
sizes by the elapsed duration of unemployment. Differences between effects at low du-
rations and high durations may shed light on the extent to which individual behavior
changes over time and this may be relevant for policy design (see e.g. Van den Berg
(2001)). Empirical studies therefore tend to estimate effect sizes on hazard rates or on
conditional survival probabilities at a range of elapsed durations.
However, the identification of such dynamic treatment effects is hampered by some
hurdles even if the assignment is randomized. First, suppose the treatment is random-
ized at some elapsed duration t after inflow into some state of interest. In the presence
of unobserved determinants of the outcome, their distributions among survivors at some
later point in time will differ across different treatment arms; see Meyer (1996), Ham and
LaLonde (1996), Eberwein et al. (1997) and Abbring and van den Berg (2005). A second
hurdle is posed by the standard issue of noncompliance. If individuals can choose a treat-
ment status different from the one that has been assigned to them, then estimation results
will suffer from the standard selection bias. We refer to these two hurdles as dynamic
and static endogeneity, respectively. A third hurdle is posed by the fact that duration
variables are often subject to right-censoring. In this paper, we develop an instrumental
variable (IV) approach for identification and estimation of dynamic treatment effects on
the conditional survival function and the hazard of a duration variable. Our method
solves the dynamic and static endogeneity problems and allows for right-censoring. We
do not adopt parametric or semiparametric structures. We also do not impose indepen-
dence of observed and unobserved characteristics or separability in their effects on the
outcome. We propose estimation procedures and derive their asymptotic properties. Our
estimators are dynamic versions of the Wald estimator.
We focus on a setting in which a single comprehensive treatment is assigned at a specific
calendar point in time to all individuals in some state of interest. A typical example is
a labor market policy reform that changes the unemployment benefits system. Cohorts
of individuals receive the treatment at the same point in calendar time but at different
elapsed durations of their spells. The policy intervention can be regarded as exogenous,
but due to dynamic selection the distribution of unobserved characteristics at the moment
of treatment will differ across cohorts. Additionally, we allow for noncompliance in the
sense that individuals may influence the extent to which they are exposed to the new
policy regime. As an alternative example, we may replace the role of the labor market
policy reform by a randomized field experiment.
Van den Berg et al. (2014) considered exogenous policy interventions and demonstrated
that nonparametric causal inference of effects on hazard rates and conditional survival
probabilities greatly benefits from the availability of data in which ongoing spells are inter-
rupted by the intervention. In particular, such data allow for a comparison of subsamples
of treated and not-yet treated that experienced the same dynamic selection pattern at
durations before the elapsed duration at which the treated subsample was exposed to the
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intervention. Our approach also exploits ongoing spells that are interrupted by an exoge-
nous intervention. The major contribution of our paper is to allow for partial compliance.
Thus, the treatment assignment is not mandatory, and only some of those assigned select
into it. The problem of noncompliance has received much attention in the static evaluation
literature in recent years (references are provided below). This contrasts to noncompliance
in a dynamic nonparametric context. We achieve identification of treatment effects using
the time to assigned treatment as an instrument for the actual treatment status. Notice
that we effectively have a setting in which the instrumental variable and the treatment
indicator are realized at the same elapsed duration. This serves to prevent that individuals
respond to the instrumental variable before the treatment indicator is realized, in which
case the dynamic selection pattern would differ between the subsamples of those who
are assigned to the treatment and those who are not.
In the second part of the paper we evaluate the French 2001 labor market policy
reform PARE which changed the dependence of unemployment benefits on the elapsed
unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced additional active labor market
policy measures. Individuals who were unemployed at the moment of the reform could
choose whether to stay in the old regime for the remaining duration of their spell – or
to enter the new regime immediately. In this empirical analysis we apply the methods
devised in the first part of the paper. This includes an extensive examination of the
plausibility of the assumptions required for the use of the methods. We address the non-
testable independent right-censoring assumption in a simulation study. This suggests
that the estimation results are robust to violations of the assumption, primarily because
violations that are likely to occur in the PARE setting have opposite directions and offset
each other’s impact on the estimates.
An additional contribution of our paper concerns the development of a theoretical
framework to analyze the importance of endogeneity due to noncompliance in a dy-
namic setting. Specifically, we propose how to measure the extent of noncompliance and
the bias that would be induced if its role is ignored. Understanding noncompliance is
an important ingredient in the analysis of policy effectiveness and policy design. Pilot
studies with noncompliance can be used to derive bounds for the effect of a comprehen-
sive policy reform with perfect compliance. Our methods are based on a comparison of
untreated noncompliers with a whole nontreated cohort at the same elapsed duration. In
the empirical analysis, the results indicate that noncompliance is endogenous and that
one major reason for noncompliance is the expectation of a quick exit. These findings are
in line with Blasco (2009) who studied noncompliance in the PARE reform.
By dealing with both dynamic and static selection, our paper provides a link between
the IV literature on treatment effects, the literature on dynamic treatment evaluation, and
the regression discontinuity literature. The emphasis on noncompliance and IV estimation
means that the link to the existing literature on IV in survival models and dynamic
models is particularly strong. Much of the latter literature is surveyed in Abbring and
van den Berg (2005). Eberwein et al. (1997) were the first to introduce IV in econometric
survival analysis. They applied this to study the causal effect of training on unemployment
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durations. See also Robins and Tsiatis (1991), Chesher (2002), Bijwaard and Ridder (2005),
Heckman and Navarro (2007), Bijwaard (2008) and Tchetgen et al. (2014). Typically, these
studies adopt a semiparametric or a parametric model structure.1 Abbring and van den
Berg (2005) develop a nonparametric IV estimator of the local average treatment effect on
the survival function for the case that instrument and treatment indicator are realized at
the inflow into the state of interest.
Another branch of literature that is relevant for our study comprises of existing empir-
ical evaluations of the PARE reform. These impose semiparametric or parametric model
structures and/or focus on other outcome measures than we do. They are discussed in
section 3 below. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We present our IV
approach in section 2. In section 3, we apply our IV method to the French labor market
policy reform PARE. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. Identification and estimation of dynamic treatment effects
2.1. Notation and a framework for dynamic treatment evaluation. Assume that all
agents in some state of interest O are assigned to receive a treatment at a specific calendar
point in time r > 0. We are interested in the causal effect of this treatment on the distribution
of the duration of stay in O. We embed our analysis in a framework with dynamic potential
outcomes. We assume that potential outcomes of the individual i depend on pretreatment
characteristics Xi and Vi, of which the q-dimensional Xi is observed, q ≥ 1, and the
one-dimensional Vi not. Let the random variable Zi denote the time from inflow to the
assigned point in time of treatment and Si the elapsed duration in O at which individual
i actually receives the treatment. Si is a choice variable whereas Zi is exogenous. For each
X = x,V = v,Z = z,S = s, denote with Ti(s, z,x,v) the potential duration of stay in O of
individual i if he or she had characteristics (x,v) and received (z, s) as values for (Z,S).
We allow Ti(s, z,x,v) to be a random variable. This assumption reflects some intrinsic
uncertainty in the transition, not necessarily observed and/or controlled by the agent,
see Lancaster (1990) for a discussion. Throughout the paper, we assume that Z is an
exclusion restriction in the sense that Ti(s, z,x,v) = Ti(s,x,v). For notational simplicity,
we will suppress the dependence on X and V as well as the individual index i and write
simply T(s).
This setup corresponds to a labor market program implementation, in which a policy
reform is administered at a fixed point in time. Our methods however, as shown in
the discussion below, can be extended to a setup with ongoing programs, in which the
treatment is assigned at random points in time to different individuals. In a labor market
context, X might be education, gender, number of siblings, age and experience at inflow,
whereas V might be the ability of an unemployed or his or her motivation. In a medical
study, X might be some observed health marker, whereas V might be some genetic
unobserved component. X and V obtain values in ΩX and ΩV.
1The use of dynamic discrete choice models such as the reduced-form model in Heckman and Navarro
(2007) enables the evaluation of complex treatment effects as well as the distribution of counterfactuals.
Identification allows for general time-varying unobservables but uses identification at infinity as well as
some separability and random effects assumptions.
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We enrich this dynamic framework by allowing the agents to opt out of the assigned
treatment. We refer to this opting out as static selection. To fix ideas, for each z ∈ R+ and
each (x,v) ∈ ΩX ×ΩV, let the random variable S(z,x,v) denote the potential compliance
status of an individual with observed and unobserved characteristics x and v, respectively,
given that the treatment z is assigned to that individual. For notational simplicity, we write
S(z). S(z) can be interpreted as the potential elapsed duration in O at which an agent
would like to be treated, if he or she was assigned to be treated at elapsed duration z.
To make the model tractable, an agent is only allowed to accept or reject an assigned
treatment, and the treatment is only offered once (see assumption A1 in the following
subsection, as well as the corresponding discussion). Thus, for each z ∈ R+, S(z) may
take only the values z ( the case of compliance) and ∞ (the case of noncompliance).2
Agents are allowed to have an arbitrary time structure of their compliance preferences.
A cancer suffering patient might be reluctant to accept a new therapy at an early stage of
the disease, but his or her preference might change at an advanced stage of the disease.
Similarly, an unemployed person might refuse a training early in the unemployment spell
and be willing to attend it later on. To account for the possibility of changing preferences,
we refer to individuals who would be willing to receive a treatment at some elapsed
duration z, given that they were asked to do so, as z-compliers. This notion generalizes
the static compliance definition.
Allowing for static selection is common in the standard literature on (static) treatment
evaluation, see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007). In a labor market program, unemployed
individuals might decide not to accept an offer for a training or a counselling service. In a
medical study, patients assigned to drop out from a therapy might be able to participate
in a substitute program. Selection into or out of a certain treatment status creates a
potential endogeneity problem, which has given rise to the development of the Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) literature, see Imbens and Angrist (1994). Typically, the
randomized treatment assignment is used as an instrument for the endogenous actual
treatment status.3
Let T be the actual duration of the spell. T might be right censored by a random variable
C. Define T̃ ∶= min{T,C} and the censoring indicator δ ∶= 1{T̃ = T}. We observe (T̃, δ) and
not directly (T,C). We assume access to an i.i.d. sample
(T̃1,S1,Z1,X1, δ1), . . . , (T̃n,Sn,Zn,Xn, δn),
where Si is missing if Si > T̃i.
Remark
Unless explicitly otherwise stated, we will denote with t, s, z elapsed durations in O (and
not calendar time). Thus, for example, 0 refers to the point in time of inflow of an agent
into O. Furthermore, we do not need a binary process Di(t) that denotes the treatment
2Alternatively, we might restrict the maximal potential duration of the state of interest to be equal to
some positive real number S¯. In that case, noncompliers receive S(z) = S¯. We do not differentiate between
these two cases and write ∞.
3In line with the biometry literature, this instrument is also called Intention-to-Treat (ITT)
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status of an agent i at time t. Before the calendar point in time r, nobody is treated. After
r, all compliers are treated, that is, all individuals whose value of S is equal to the corre-
sponding value of Z. Therefore, the treatment status can be deduced from S, Z and the
calendar time.
Let t ≥ t′′. The treatment effect of interest is
(2.1) P(T(s) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(s) ≥ t′′,X,V) − P(T(s′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(s′) ≥ t′′,X,V),
that is, the additive effect of replacing the treatment s′ with the treatment s on the prob-
ability to exit the state of interest between t and t + a conditionally on surviving up to t′′.
The case s′ =∞ induces a comparison between those treated at s and those never treated.
Another special case is the limit case a → 0, t′′ = t. Denote with θT(s)(t ∣ X,V) the hazard
of T(s) at t for an individual with characteristics X and V. Then the individual additive
treatment on the hazard at t is defined as
(2.2) θT(s)(t ∣ X,V) − θT(s′)(t ∣ X,V).
It reflects the additive change in the exit rate induced by a change of the treatment from
s′ to s. One appealing feature of additive treatment effects is their intuitive interpretation.
To see this, write P(T(s) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(s) ≥ t′′) = E[1{T(s) ∈ [t, t + a)} ∣ T(s) ≥ t′′,X,V].
The indicator function is a Bernoulli random variable and its distribution is completely
determined by its expectation.
One might be interested in identifying the (additive) effect on the unconditional survival
function, that is, t′′ = 0:
(2.3) P(T(s) ∈ [t, t + a)) − P(T(s′) ∈ [t, t + a)),
However, this precludes dynamic selection; see Abbring and van den Berg (2005) for
a discussion.4 Often though it might be of interest to identify the effect of a treatment
assigned at a later point in time only for those who actually would receive the treatment.
In the labor market example, such a case would arise if a treatment is targeted at longterm
unemployed individuals. In the medical example, due to its side effects, a therapy might
be targeted only at patients who are at an advanced stage of a disease. For this reason, we
consider the general case of conditioning on survival up to a point t′′ = t for 0 ≤ t = s < s′ ≤∞, that is
(2.4) P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V) − P(T(s′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(s′) ≥ t,X,V).
Conditioning on survival has one further justification. Note that allowing for noncompli-
ance requires the observability of the compliance status. In our framework, individuals
who exit the state of interest prior to revealing compliance preferences have an unknown
compliance status (that is, we do not know whether they are compliers).
We do not impose a parametric form on the distribution of T(s) and we allow for
separability and general dependence of observed and unobserved covariates X and V,
respectively. The restriction t = s is necessary to ”unify” the dynamic selection between
treated and untreated, as discussed in the next subsection. By redefining s to be the time
4Abbring and van den Berg (2005) consider a case with conditioning on a positive elapsed spell duration,
t′′ > 0, that is, conditioning on T(s) > t′′, t′′ > 0, and derive bounds for the effect.
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to dropout of a treatment, we can analyze the effect of the length s of a treatment on the
distribution of T(s).
There are two limitations we have to consider. First, not specifying the dependence
of the distributions of T(s) and the unobservables V makes it impossible to identify the
individual treatment effect (2.4). The price to pay for the functional form generality is that
we have to average V out. Due to dynamic selection, the distribution of the unobservables
might 1) be different in the subpopulation of survivors at some point in time t > 0 from
the distribution in the whole population and 2) differ among different treatment arms.
Therefore, it arises the question over which distribution of V to average. Van den Berg
et al. (2014) suggest to condition on different subpopulations of survivors, such as treated
survivors. A second limitation that arises in our context due to the possibility of static
selection is that one can observe only the t-compliers with the treatment. This problem has
been discussed in the literature on static treatment effects, see Imbens and Angrist (1994).
Their solution is to consider only a treatment effect on the subpopulation of compliers.
We adapt this restriction to our dynamic concept of compliance. We condition on S(t) = t.
This restricts the analysis to the subpopulation of t-compliers, that is, to those individuals
who would take the treatment at an elapsed duration of t if they were asked to do so. With
these considerations, we define the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Complying
Survivors, shortly TE, as
TE(t, t′, a) ∶= E[P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,S(t) = t,X,V) −(2.5)
P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,S(t) = t,X,V) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,S(t) = t,X].
The effects on the nontreated and on the whole population are defined analogously.5 The
positive constant a is chosen such that a < t′ − t. This restriction insures a comparison of
treated with nontreated individuals. Similarly, the treatment effect on the hazard (HTE)
is defined as
HTE(t, t′) ∶= E[θT(t)(t ∣ S(t) = t,X,V) −(2.6)
θT(t′)(t ∣ S(t) = t,X,V) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,S(t) = t,X].
Remark
An alternative treatment effect that can be considered in this framework is a relative effect
on the hazard rate at t, θT(s)(t ∣ X,V)/θT(s′)(t ∣ X,V). Abbring and van den Berg (2005)
prove identification of this treatment effect under multiplicative unobserved heterogene-
ity, that is, under θT(s)(t ∣ X,V) = θ∗T(s)(t ∣ X).V. We do not pursue this approach here.
Remark
Our model can be applied to an alternative setup, in which individual spells have the
same starting point 0 in calendar time, but the agents receive the treatment at different
points in time. Here, a cohort {Z = t} consist of all individuals who are assigned to receive
the treatment at calendar time t.
5In fact, they coincide under the assumptions introduced in the next subsection, see proposition 2.1.
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2.2. Identification of dynamic treatment effects. In this section, we show that there
exists a function that links the joint distribution of the observables with the treatment
effect. As a result, the treatment effect is identified. We derive this function explicitly.
Thus, our identification strategy is constructive in the sense that it provide a guidance for
estimation. We adopt the following assumptions:
A1 (Single treatment) : for any t it holds either S(t) = t or S(t) = +∞.
A2 (No anticipation) : For each real t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 and each X,V holds
ΘT(t′)(t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)) = ΘT(∞)(t ∣ X,V,S(t),S(t′)),
where ΘT(s) is the integrated hazard of T(s).
A3 (Randomization) : For the instrument Z it holds
i) Z y {T(s),S(t)}t,s∈R+⋃{+∞} ∣ X,V and ii) Z y V ∣ X.
A4 (Consistency) For all t, s ∈ R+⋃{+∞}
i) Z = t⇒ S(t) = S
ii) S = s⇒ T(s) = T
(1) Assumption A1 defines the possible types of noncompliance. Agents are only
allowed to choose between being treated at the assigned point in time and being
never treated. A1 precludes the type of choices S(t) = t′ for some t′ ≠ t with t′ <∞.
A1 is compatible with a setup where the treatment is administered at a single
point in calendar time and agents have no access to an alternative treatment. This
setup corresponds to a one-sided noncompliance in the static treatment evaluation
literature. One-sided noncompliance precludes the existence of always-takers.6 As
a result, no monotonicity-type assumption (as the one invoked in Imbens and
Angrist (1994)) is needed for identification. Assumptions A1 and A4 imply together
that the actual elapsed duration at which the treatment is received, S, can be either
equal to Z or to ∞.
(2) Assumption A2 states basically that future treatments are not allowed to influence
the past. The assumption implies that the individual probability of a survival up to
t is the same for any two future treatments t′, t′′, t ≤ t′, t′′. In a model with forward
looking agents, A2 requires that agents either have no knowledge on the point
in time of treatment (i.e. they do not anticipate it) or that they do not act upon
that knowledge. Technically, jointly with assumption A3, the ”no anticipation”
assumption is used to ensure equal pretreatment patterns of dynamic selection in
the different treatment arms, see proposition (2.1) below as well as the discussion
in the paragraphs right before and after proposition (2.1). In the context of active
labor market policies, the ”no anticipation” assumption is plausible in numerous
settings (see Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for a discussion). Often the start of
a training program and the assignment to treatment are dictated by budget and
other administrative reasons and appear to the unemployed as random. Those as-
signed to the treatment might be chosen at random from all eligible unemployed.
6See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for the definitions of always-takers and never-takers.
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Moreover, the assignment may occur without a preliminary notice so that the tim-
ing is unexpected to the unemployed. This is almost by definition true for punitive
treatments such as sanctions. Notice also that the exact content and point in time
of implementation of a policy reform are often a subject to persistent debates. The
resulting uncertainty might deter agents from building an anticipation about start
and content of the reform. Most of the empirical evaluation literature on active
labor market policies tacitly assumes absence of anticipatory effects. In our empir-
ical application, we argue in detail that this extends to the case of the French policy
reform PARE. Note that conditioning on S(t),S(t′) ensures that we adopt the ”no
anticipation” assumption for all relevant subpopulations, in particular for the sub-
population of compliers, {S(t) = t}, and for the subpopulation of noncompliers,{S(t) =∞}.
(3) Assumption A3 is a randomization assumption. A3 i) implies that once we con-
dition on observables and unobservables, there is no selection into the different
treatment assignments. Taken together, i) and ii) imply the conditional indepen-
dence assumption
(2.7) Z y {T(s),S(t)} ∣ X.
In the empirical analysis, A3 requires a stable (macro-) economic environment
in the period of consideration. Economic structural brakes and mass layoffs might
cause a violation of A3. A version of the implication (2.7) is testable, see the
empirical investigation below for a discussion.
(4) The consistency assumption implies that a potential outcome corresponding to a
given treatment is observed if the treatment is actually assigned. Another way to
write it is T = T(S),S = S(Z). A4 provides the link between potential outcomes and
observations and is necessary for identification.
In addition to assumptions A1-A4, we implicitly assume that all expressions below
exist. This amounts to common support assumptions such as 0 < P(S = t ∣ X,V,Z = t).
These assumptions imply either that S and Z are discrete or that at least they have a
positive probability mass on t and t′.7 Whether discrete Z and S impose a restriction
on the distribution of T depends on the concrete application. In the medical treatment
example, a specific therapy might be assigned only at predetermined, common for ev-
erybody, elapsed time intervals of the disease, whereas the life or disease duration itself
is a continuous variable. In the labor market example, the administrative duration of
unemployment is always discrete. Nevertheless, it is usually modeled in the literature as
a continuous variable, especially when it is measured on a daily basis. On the other hand,
labor market treatments such as training and counselling measures or financial penalties
might be designed to come into force only at coarser time intervals. Therefore, it might
be practical to model them as discrete variables.
Suppose for the moment that T is observable (the case with right censoring is considered
at the end of this subsection). As a motivation for our identification strategy, consider first
7If a = b = 0, then we define the expression a/b to be equal to 0.
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the following naive candidates for a treatment effect:
(2.8) P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t)
and
(2.9) P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t′,Z = t′)
for t′ > t. Writing (2.8) in the form
E[P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t,V) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t] −
E[P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t,V) ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t]
makes it clear that it compares averages over two different subpopulations of the same
cohort: the t-compliers and the t-noncompliers. These two subpopulations might have
different distributions of the unobserved heterogeneity V because the treatment status S is
a choice variable. As a consequence, it would hold that V upmodels_uni0338 S ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t. We will refer
to this consequence as static endogeneity or static selection. The (potential) endogeneity
arises immediately with the decision to accept or refuse the treatment. As a result, (2.8)
would capture not only the treatment effect but also the bias from the static selection.
We use the naive treatment effect (2.8) to analyze the nature of endogeneity. We compare
it to our IV estimator to construct a test for exogeneity, see section 2.5 for details. The
difference between (2.8) and the IV estimator is informative about the selection process.
A better understanding of the selection might be used to impose more structure on the
model. In our empirical application, an estimator of (2.8) is shown to underestimate the
positive treatment effect. Hence, the control group must contain many quick exits, which
sheds light on the reasons for the non-take up of the reform.
The naive treatment effect (2.9) compares the average outcome of the t-compliers from
the younger cohort {Z = t} with the average outcome of the t’-compliers of the older
cohort {Z = t′}. Due to dynamic selection, this comparison amounts to averaging over
two potentially different distributions of V. (2.9) can be used to shed light on the nature
of this dynamic selection process.
Both examples demonstrate the importance and difficulty of the choice of a treatment
and a control groups in a setting with static and dynamic selection. We propose a strategy
that can deal with both types of selection. The intuition for this strategy is as follows. An
appealing choice for a treatment group is the set of compliers from the cohort {Z = t}:
consistency links observed outcomes of the treated compliers with the potential outcomes.
Suppose for the moment that we observe the potential compliance status at any point
in time. Then, one possible control group for the treated t-compliers from cohort {Z = t}
would be the not yet treated group of t-compliers from the older cohort who survive
at least t time units. The intuition behind this choice is the following. If the unobserved
heterogeneity V has the same distribution in the two cohorts at the point in time of inflow,
and if these distributions evolve over time in the same way, then V will have the same
distribution in the two cohorts at a later pretreatment elapsed duration t > 0. The equality
of the distributions of V at t = 0 is ensured by the randomization assumptions A3 i) and
ii). The dynamics is controlled by the ”no anticipation” assumption A2. This idea is first
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developed in Van den Berg et al. (2014) for the case of perfect compliance. It amounts to
a direct comparison of the average outcomes of two cohorts. In a first step, we generalize
the result of Van den Berg et al. (2014) to a setting with endogenous compliance.
Proposition 2.1. Let F be a cdf. Under assumptions A1 to A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0
FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T(t′)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T≥t,X,S=t,Z=t.
Proposition 2.1 states that the unobservables have the same dynamics for two potential
treatments on the set of t-compliers. It also links the distribution of V given a potential
treatment to the distribution of V in the subpopulation of observed t-compliers, {S = t,Z =
t}. There are two immediate consequences of proposition 2.1. First, the treatment effects
on the treated survivors, on the nontreated survivors and on all survivors, respectively,
coincide. Second, the following result holds:
Corollary 2.1. Let a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0
TE(t, t′, a) = P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)−P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).
The following proposition provides the key identification result:
Proposition 2.2. Let a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, TE(t, t′, a) is nonparametrically
identified for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 and it holds
(2.10)
TE(t, t′, a) = P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t)
The intuition for identification is the following. Corollary 2.1 provides a direct hint
on how to choose the treatment group. t-compliers from the cohort {Z = t} reveal their
preferences at the point in time of treatment. We can therefore link potential and observed
outcomes using A4, proposition 2.1 and corollary 2.1. The main obstacle for constructing
a control group is that we do not observe the compliance status of individuals in the
older cohort {Z = t′} at elapsed duration t. Agents reveal their preferences at the time
of treatment. In line with the argumentation above, due to dynamic selection, the sub-
population of t’-compliers differs from the subpopulation of t-compliers in terms of the
distribution of V. The key to identification is the observation, that the potential outcome
corresponding to a certain treatment is the sum of potential outcomes of compliers and
noncompliers, weighted by their proportions. Written in a simplified notation, we have
(2.11) F0 = FC,0PC + FN,0PN,
where the zero indicates the no-treatment case8, and, with a temporary abuse of nota-
tion, C and N denote compliers and noncompliers, respectively. In order to link FC,0 =(F0 − FN,0PN)/PC to observables, it is sufficient to express F0,PC,PN and FN,0 in terms of
observables. Due to assumptions A1-A4 (in particular to no anticipation), the average
8The correct expression should be ”not yet treated-case”. Under the ”no anticipation” assumption,
however, this distinction does not matter in the interval [t, t + a).
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outcome FN,0 of the noncompliers of the older cohort {Z = t′} is equal to the average
outcome of the noncompliers from the treatment group {Z = t}, see Lemma A.1, part
2. Both subgroups do not anticipate and do not receive the treatment. The average out-
come of the noncompliers from {Z = t} is identified, see Lemma A.1, part 1. Note that
an important implication of randomisation, no anticipation and consistency is that the
actual assignment of the treatment does not change the behaviour of noncompliers. The
proportions PC and PC are identified in an analogous way, see lemma A.2. Finally, F0 can
be linked directly to the outcomes of cohort {Z = t′} and is also identified.
Expression (2.10) has an intuitive interpretation. It adjusts the difference between the
average observed outcomes in the two cohorts by the probability to be a complier. The
adjustment takes account of the fact, that any difference between the two cohorts can be
caused only by the compliers. Our result is in the spirit of the static one-sided noncom-
pliance result of Bloom (1984). This resemblance seems natural in a setting where agents
are allowed to refuse an assigned treatment but are not able to select into an alternative
treatment arm (i.e. choose a different point in time of treatment).
Unlike in the static treatment evaluation models, randomization alone is not enough to
ensure identification. An experiment might be randomized at t = 0 but due to dynamic
selection endogeneity arises over time. The ”no anticipation” assumption precludes this
possibility.
Remark
A special case of proposition 2.2 is the limit case a→ 0. We devote a separate section on
its identification and estimation because of the importance and specifics of hazards.
Remark
Under A1-A4, we have P(T ∈ [t, t+a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) = P(T ∈ [t, t+a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′′) for
all t′, t′′ ≥ t+ a (in the limit case a→ 0 simply for t′, t′′ > t). To see this, note that under A2, it
holds P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t+a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(T(t′′) ∈ [t, t+a) ∣ T(t′′) ≥ t,X) for all t′, t′′ ≥ t+a. On
the other hand, the treatment effect TE (HTE) is identified only for t′ that fulfils t′ ≥ t + a
(or t′, t′′ > t). As a consequence, it follows that the treatment effects do not depend on the
choice of the nontreated cohort t′ as long as t′ ≥ t + a (or t′ > t). Therefore, we omit the
dependence on t′ and write TE(t, a) and HTE(t).
Thus far, we have assumed we can observe the whole length of spells in the state of
interest, T. A typical feature of duration data is that observations might be censored.
In this paper, we consider right censoring.9 In labor market studies, right censoring
typically arises when at the end of the study the individuals are still unemployed, so
the unemployment spell has an unknown length. The unemployed might also simply
stop attending the training and drop out of the study (sample attrition). In addition, the
job search might be interrupted by a transition out of the labor force due to maternity,
sickness, military service or other reasons. In biomedical studies, and particularly in
clinical trials, spells are right-censored when patients die from another cause (competing
9Extensions to left or interval censoring are straightforward.
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risks) or withdraw from treatment. We introduce formally right censoring in the following
way: let C be a real nonnegative random variable. We observe (T̃, δ) and not directly (T,C).
It is not possible to recover nonparametrically the joint distribution of T and C from the
distribution of (T̃, δ) without additional assumptions. The reason for this impossibility is a
nonidentification result that goes back to Cox (1962) and Tsiatis (1975), namely that to each
pair of latent variables (Td,Cd) there exists an independent pair of variables (Ti,Ci) that is
observationally equivalent to (Td,Cd). To achieve identification, we adopt the following
additional standard assumption:
A5) (Random censoring)
C y (T,S) ∣ X,Z.
Assumption A5 is nontestable due to the nonidentification result of Tsiatis (1975). In
the context of our empirical application, we show with a Monte Carlo simulation that
plausible violations of A5 offset each other. Thus, our estimation results are likely to be
robust against violations of A5. With A5, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Under assumptions A1 - A5 TE(t,a) is identified.
The proof of proposition 2.3 is straightforward. The probabilities P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥
t,X,Z = j) for j ∈ {t, t′} can be written as differences of survival functions and be estimated
consistently with a Kaplan-Meier estimator, see section 2.3 for details. Note also that for
the cohort {Z = t}, S is observed whenever T̃ ≥ t,10 so that due to A5
(2.12) P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) = P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,C ≥ t,X,Z = t) = P(S = t ∣ T̃ ≥ t,X,Z = t).
The last probability in (2.12) contains only observables and can be consistently estimated
from the data.
2.3. IV estimation of dynamic treatment effects. To ease notation, probability and sur-
vival functions concerning the cohorts {Z = t} and {Z = t′} are denoted with an in-
dex 1 and 2, respectively. For example, we write P1(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t) instead of
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,Z = t). Furthermore, we ignore the dependence on observed covari-
ates X.11 Assumptions A2 and A3 are adapted accordingly. The generalization to the case
with covariates is straightforward. Denote with F¯1 and F¯2 the survival functions of T in
the two cohorts, F¯i(t) ∶= Pi(T > t). A starting point for our estimation procedure is the
equality
(2.13) TE(t, a) = 1
P1(S = t ∣ T ≥ t)( F¯2(t + a)F¯2(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) ),
which holds under assumptions A1-A4. It follows from the result in proposition 2.2
together with Pi(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t) = 1−F¯i(t+a)/F¯i(t). T might be censored so that we only
observe (T̃, δ). F¯i(t) can be consistently estimated with the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Under
10This follows from assumptions A1 and A4.
11There are four cases of interest: estimation of TE with/without covariates and estimation of HTE
with/without covariates. We consider two complementary cases, namely TE without covariates and HTE
with covariates. The case TE with covariates follows in a straightforward way when one uses the estimator
of Gonzalez-Manteiga and Cadarso-Suarez (2007) instead of the unconditional Kaplan-Meier estimator.
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the independent censoring assumption A5 and additional mild regularity conditions, it
holds ̂¯
iF(t) = F¯i(t) + op(1) and(2.14) √
n ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t)) d→ N(0, σ2i (t)) as n→∞,(2.15)
where σ2i (t) is the asymptotic variance of the Kaplan-Meier estimator, t ∈ [0,∞), see e.g.
page 18 ff. Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002).12 The additional regularity conditions can be
found in standard references for survival analysis, see e.g. Andersen et al. (1997), chapter
IV.3 or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), chapter 5.6. We do not state them explicitly. All
results hold for continuous as well as discrete time.
Next, under the independent right-censoring assumption, it holds
(2.16) P1(S = t ∣ T ≥ t) = P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,Z = t,C ≥ t) = P1(S = t ∣ T̃ ≥ t) =∶ p > 0.
p contains only observables and is nonparametrically identified. Let p̂ ∶= P̂1(S = t ∣ T̃ ≥ t) be
a consistent nonparametric estimator of p. We define the IV-estimator T̂E(t, a) of TE(t, a)
as
(2.17) T̂E(t, a) = 1
p̂
(̂¯2F(t + a)̂¯
2F(t) −
̂¯
1F(t + a)̂¯
1F(t) ).
Its asymptotic properties are similar to those derived in Abbring and van den Berg (2005)
for the case where both the instrument and the treatment status are realized upon inflow
into the state of interest (i.e., t = 0). Here we allow for conditioning on survival up to
t and we only consider one-sided noncompliance. The following proposition states the
consistency of (2.17).
Proposition 2.4. Suppose (2.14) holds. Then, under assumptions A1-A5, it holds
T̂E(t, a) − TE(t, a) = op(1)
for each admissible pair (t, a).
This result follows directly from the continuity of the function G(a, b, c,d, e) = 1e( ab − cd),
the Continuous Mapping Theorem and the consistency of F¯i(t) and p̂.
Consider the Null hypothesis
(2.18) H0 ∶ (Ineffective treatment) F¯2(t + a)F¯2(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) = 0.
Under (2.18), it holds√
nT̂E(t, a) = √n
p̂
(̂¯2F(t + a)̂¯
2F(t) −
̂¯
1F(t + a)̂¯
1F(t) ) =
= √n
p̂
(̂¯2F(t + a)̂¯
2F(t) − F¯2(t + a)F¯2(t) ) −
√
n
p̂
(̂¯1F(t + a)̂¯
1F(t) − F¯1(t + a)F¯1(t) )
12Equation (2.14) follows from equation (2.15).
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For i = 1,2 the Taylor expansion of ̂¯iF(t+a)̂¯
iF(t) around F¯i(t+a)F¯i(t) can be written aŝ¯
iF(t + a)̂¯
iF(t) = F¯i(t + a)F¯i(t) + 1F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) − F¯i(t + a)F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))+O[( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a))( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t)) + ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))2],
and therefore√
n( ̂¯iF(t + a)̂¯
iF(t) − F¯i(t + a)F¯i(t) ) =
√
n
F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) − F¯i(t + a)
√
n
F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t)−F¯i(t)) +O[√n( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a))( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t)) + √n( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))2].
The last term converges to zero in probability.
With (2.15), the terms
√
n
F¯i(t)( ̂¯iF(t + a) − F¯i(t + a)) and F¯i(t + a)
√
n
F¯2i (t) ( ̂¯iF(t) − F¯i(t))
are asymptotically normally distributed with mean 0 and variances
1
F¯2i (t)σi(t + a) and F¯
2
i (t + a)
F¯4i (t) σi(t), respectively.
With the independence of the random variables D1 and D2, where Di = ̂¯iF(t+a)̂¯
iF(t) , i = 1,2, we
can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. Let assumptions A1-A5 and condition (2.15) hold. Then, under the null (2.18),
it holds
(2.19)
√
nT̂E(t, a) d→ N(0, 1
p2
2∑
i=1 ( 1F¯2i (t)σi(t + a) + F¯
2
i (t + a)
F¯4i (t) σi(t) + F¯i(t + a)F¯3i (t) σi(t, t + a))),
where σi(t, t + a) is the covariance of ̂¯iF(t) and ̂¯iF(t + a).
Confidence bands can be constructed by replacing the unknown terms in the variance
with consistent estimates, for example using the Greenwood’s formula, see Andersen
et al. (1997). It follows from (2.19) that the precision of the estimator is inversely related
to p. The bigger the compliance probability p, i.e. the stronger the instrument Z for the
endogenous S, the smaller the variance of the IV-estimator. This intuitive result is in line
with the standard static IV literature. (2.17) can be interpreted as a dynamic version of the
Wald estimator. A generalization to the case of covariates can be achieved by replacing
the unconditional Kaplan-Meier estimator with the conditional estimator of Gonzalez-
Manteiga and Cadarso-Suarez (2007), following the same steps as here.
2.4. Identification and estimation of additive treatment effects on the hazard. In this
subsection, we state conditions under which the treatment effect on the hazard, (2.6), is
identified and develop the estimation theory. The HTE deserves a special attention for
two reasons. First, the hazard of the duration variable represents the most interesting
feature of its distribution in multiple applications, see Van den Berg (2001) for various
examples and a discussion. Second, estimation of hazard effects in a treatment evaluation
framework involves estimation at the boundary of the admissible domain. We develop
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an estimator that takes into account the region of estimation and does not lead to an
increased bias.
2.4.1. Identification. Write W = (X,V) and let ΩW be the set of possible values for W.
Further, write Ψ(t ∣ X) ∶= HTE(t,X) (we stress explicitly the dependence on X) and define
θ(t ∣ X) ∶= limdt→0 P(T ∈ [t, t + dt ∣ T ≥ t,X))/dt (all expressions are assumed to exist). The
rest of the notation is the same as in the last sections. Again we assume access to an i.i.d.
sample (T̃1,S1,Z1,X1, δ1), . . . , (T̃n,Sn,Zn,Xn, δn).
Our first result is the following
Proposition 2.6. Let the measurable function g ∶ R+ × ΩW → R+ fulfill E[g(t,W)] < ∞ and∣ θ(t ∣ W = w) ∣≤ g(t,w) for each (t,w) ∈ R+ ×ΩW. Then, under assumptions A1-A5, Ψ(t ∣ X) is
identified and it holds
(2.20) Ψ(t ∣ X) ∶= θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) − θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) .
Under the Lebesque dominated convergence theorem,
θ(t ∣ X) = lim
dt→0E[P(T ∈ [t, t + dt) ∣ T ≥ t,X,V)/dt ∣ T ≥ t,X] = E[θ(t ∣ X,V)],
and the proof follows directly from proposition 2.2. Thus, as expected, the HTE is revealed
to be the limit case of the general treatment effect TE, HTE = limdt→0TE/dt. In the case of
a full compliance, that is P(S = t ∣ T ≤ t,X,Z = t) = 1, HTE reduces to θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) − θ(t ∣
X,Z = t′) which is the result of Van den Berg et al. (2014).
2.4.2. Estimation. Henceforth, we denote with θ1(t ∣ X) the hazard θ(t ∣ X,Z = t) of the
younger cohort , {Z = t}, and with θ2(t ∣ X) the hazard θ(t ∣ X,Z = t′) of the older cohort. If
the treatment is effective, then there will be a jump in the hazard function at the moment
of treatment (per definition). Hence, when estimating Ψ(t ∣ X), only the observations T̃
that are bigger than or equal to t are informative about θ1(t ∣ X).13This leads to estimating
a hazard at the left boundary of the interval [t, T¯) where T¯ is some maximum duration,
possibly ∞. Smooth hazard estimators that use a symmetric kernel would have a large
bias at t, a problem called boundary effect in the literature, Mu¨ller and Wang (1994).
Without loss of generality, let [0,1] be the set of possible values of the duration variable
and b = b(n) a bandwidth of a kernel estimator, b < 0.5. The set BL ∶= {t ∶ 0 ≤ t < b} is called
a left boundary region (we do not discuss problems arising at the right boundary here).
Employing a symmetric kernel to estimate the hazard at a point from that region could
lead to a high bias, because the support of the kernel exceeds the range of the data. In the
interior (0,1), this is only a finite sample problem. At the boundary t = 0, the problem
persists with increasing sample size n. Boundary problems are not endemic to hazards,
they arise also in the estimation of a density function, see Karunamuni and Alberts (2005).
Mu¨ller and Wang (1994) develop a class of asymmetric kernels and use them to adapt the
unconditional Ramlau-Hansen estimator to the boundary case. The kernels vary with the
point of estimation and have a support that does not exceed the range of the duration
13This does not apply to θ2(t ∣ X).
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variable. These kernels are referred to as boundary kernels. Following this approach, we
adapt the conditional kernel hazard estimator of Nielsen and Linton (1995) to the case of
estimation at the boundary by using boundary kernels. For simplicity, we assume that
we estimate Ψ(t ∣ x) at an interior point x of ΩX. Let k be a symmetric one-dimensional
continuous density function with support [−1,1], that is
∫ 1−1 k(y)dy = 1 and ∫ 1−1 yk(y)dy = 0
and define k1 and k2 as
k1 = ∫ 1−1 y2k(y)dy and k2 = ∫ 1−1 k2(y)dy.
Define the q-dimensional product kernel K(x) = Πqi=1k(x(i)), where x = (x(1), . . . ,x(q)).
Next, let k+ denote the asymmetric kernel function
k+ ∶ [0,1] × [−1,1]→ R(h, y)→ 12(1 + h)4 (y + 1)[y(1 − 2h) + (3h2 − 2h + 1)/2].
This is a boundary kernel function as defined in Mu¨ller and Wang (1994). The support of
k+(h, .) is [−1,h]. In analogy to the symmetric kernel k, we define the second moments of
k+(0, .) as
k+1 = ∫ 0−1 y2k+(0, y)dy and k+2 = ∫ 0−1 k2+(0, y)dy.
Using standard counting processes notation, define for i = 1, . . . ,n the observed failure
process of the ith individual at time t, Ni(t) ∶= 1{T̃i ≤ t,Ti ≤ Ci} and the individual process
at risk, Yi(t) ∶= 1{T̃i ≥ t}. To differentiate between observations from the cohorts 1, that
is {Z = t}, and 2, that is {Z = t′}, we add a subscript 1 or 2, respectively. For example,
X1,i denotes an observation of X that comes from the cohort {Z = t}. Then our estimator
Ψ̂(t ∣ x) of Ψ(t ∣ x) is defined as
Ψ̂(t ∣ x) ∶= 1
pˆ1(t ∣ x)( ∑
n
i=1 K(x−X1,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN1,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X1,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y1,i(s)ds(2.21)
− ∑ni=1 K(x−X2,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN2,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X2,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y2,i(s)ds),
where pˆ1(t ∣ x) is a nonparametric estimator for p1(t ∣ x) ∶= P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X = x,Z = t).
We assume that pˆ1(t ∣ x) is consistent. In addition, for proposition 2.7 ii) we assume
that b−2(pˆ1(t ∣ x) − p1(t ∣ x)) = op(1), which can be assured by assuming that p1(t ∣ x) is
sufficiently smooth in x. The term
θˆ j(t ∣ x) ∶= ∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )dN j,i(s)∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y j,i(s)ds
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for j = 1,2 is a conditional smooth hazard estimator for θ j(t ∣ x) developed in Nielsen and
Linton (1995) and adapted to the boundary case. Define
(2.22) θ∗j (t ∣ x) ∶= ∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )θ j(s ∣ X j,i)Y j,i(s)ds∑ni=1 K(x−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(t, t−sb )Y j,i(s)ds j = 1,2
and
(2.23) Ψ∗(t ∣ x) = 1
pˆ1(t ∣ x)(θ∗1(t ∣ x) − θ∗2(t ∣ x)).
We need the following assumptions.
H1 E[Yi(s)] = u(s) and u(.) is continuous
H2 i) f (x)u(t) is positive on a neighbourhood U of (0,x0) ∈ R+ × ΩX, where x0 is
an interior point of ΩX and f is the density of X. ii) θ j is twice continuously
differentiable on U. iii) f u is continuously differentiable on U.
H3 nbq+1 →∞ and b = b(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
The following proposition states the pointwise asymptotic properties of Ψ̂(0 ∣ x0).
Proposition 2.7. Define
σ2Ψ ∶= k+2 kq2 1p21(0 ∣ x0)(θ1(0 ∣ x0)/ f1(x0) + θ2(0 ∣ x0)/ f2(x0)).
Under assumptions H1-H3, the following results hold:
i)
√
nbq+1(Ψ̂(0 ∣ x0) −Ψ∗(0 ∣ x0)) d→ N[0, σ2Ψ].
ii) If in addition b−2(pˆ1(t ∣ x) − p1(t ∣ x)) = op(1), then
b−2(Ψ∗(0 ∣ x0) −Ψ(0 ∣ x0)) p→ 2∑
i=1
(−1)i+1k+1
fi(x0)ui(0)p1(0 ∣ x0)
[∂θi(0 ∣ x0)
∂t
∂( fi(x0)ui(0))
∂t
+ 1
2
∂2θi(0 ∣ x0)
∂t2
fi(x0)ui(0) +
q∑
j=1 (∂θi(0 ∣ x0)∂x( j) ∂( fi(x0)ui(0))∂x( j) + 12 ∂2θi(0 ∣ x0)∂x( j)2 fi(x0)ui(0))]
iii) Finally, it also holds
σˆ2Ψ ∶= nbq+1pˆ1(0 ∣ x0)
2 2∑
j=1
∑ni=1 K2(x0−X j,ib ) ∫ k2+(−sb )dN j,i(s)(∑ni=1 K(x0−X j,ib ) ∫ k+(−sb )Y j,i(s)ds)2 p→
σ2Ψ
Result i) gives the asymptotic distribution of the estimator, ii) characterizes the bias
and iii) provides the standard errors for confidence bounds around Ψ∗. If the bandwidth
is chosen to be of o(n−1/(q+5)), then the asymptotic bias is negligible and proposition 2.7
can be used to construct confidence bands for Ψ.
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2.5. Framework for the analysis of endogeneity. Understanding the nature of selection
is important for setting up and evaluating a policy reform. Often a comprehensive policy
reform is preceded by a small scale pilot study that allows for noncompliance. Under-
standing the non-take up of the pilot study might help better design the reform and
derive bounds for its effect under perfect compliance. Better understanding of the endo-
geneity reasons can be used to model explicitly the selection process in more complex
(e.g. general equilibrium) models. We develop a framework for answering the following
two questions:
i) Is there endogenous selection caused by the decision of the agents to accept or
refuse the treatment?
ii) If yes, in which direction would be the bias caused by the endogenous selection?
Answering the first question requires a specification of the possible channels of (static)
endogeneity. In our framework, there are two potential endogeneity channels. First, unob-
served characteristics of the agents determine both potential outcomes and the potential
compliance decision. Second, the potential outcome itself (that is, after ”controlling” for
observed and unobserved individual characteristics) might influence the potential com-
pliance status. The first channel amounts to a violation of
(2.24) S(t) y {T(s)} ∣ X
and the second of
(2.25) S(t) y {T(s)} ∣ X,V
We preclude the possibility of a violation of (2.25): we assume that the only way the poten-
tial outcome might influence the decision S(t) is that the agent might have a knowledge
of T(s) and use it in the decision process. This individual knowledge of the potential
outcome (or its distribution) is unobserved by the econometrician. It is therefore included
in V.14 With these considerations, we define the following null hypothesis:
(2.26) H0 ∶ S(t) y {T(s)} ∣ X
For B ∶= [t, t + a), (2.26) implies the following relation:
(2.27) H̃0 ∶ P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ T(∞) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) − P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ T(∞) ≥ t,X,S(t) =∞) = 0.
Using A1-A4 and following the steps in proof of proposition 2.2, we obtain the equivalent
to (2.27) relation
(2.28) H̃0 ∶ P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) − P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t) = 0.
Intuitively, if there is no selection, then the average observed outcomes of nontreated
compliers and noncompliers should be the same. As a result, the average observed out-
come of the whole cohort {Z = t′} under no treatment (the left-hand side of (2.28)) should
be equal to the average observed outcome of the noncompliers from the cohort {Z = t}
(the right-hand side of (2.28)). Equation (2.28) contains only observables. Deriving the
distribution of the test statistics for (2.28) follows precisely the same steps as for the
14We have to assume that the agent does not learn about the potential outcomes over time. With a
time-varying V, we would lose identification.
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null hypothesis (2.18). We omit it here. A simplified testing procedure would induce a
comparison of survival functions. The corresponding null hypothesis is
(2.29) H̃0 ∶ P(T ≥ t ∣ X,Z = t′) − P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t) = 0.
A test statistics is constructed by replacing the theoretical probabilities with their Kaplan-
Meier estimators.
To answer question ii), we can compare the (theoretical proper) treatment effect (2.18)
to the naive treatment effect (2.8). Written in the simplified notation of section 2.2, this is
a comparison of a) FC,1 − FC,0 and b) FC,1 − FN,0. This ad hoc approach can be justified with
(2.27). Recall that FC,0 = (F0 − FN,0PN)/PC. Subtracting b) from a), we obtain(FC,1 − (F0 − FN,0PN)/PC) − (FC,1 − FN,0) =(FN,0PC + F0,NPN − F0)/PC = (FN,0 − F0)/PC.
The nominator (FN,0 − F0) of the last expression is precisely the left-hand side of (2.27).
3. Empirical Application: the French PARE labor market reform in 2001
3.1. The reform. We combine the IV method we developed in section 2 with a unique
empirical strategy to analyze the effect of a reform in the French unemployment insurance
system on the duration of unemployment. The new system, called Plan d’Aide au Retour
a´ l’Emploi (PARE hereafter), brings about two main changes. First, the decline of the
insurance benefits is abolished. Under the old system, called Allocation Unique Degres-
sive (AUD), the size of the payments depends on the elapsed duration of unemployment
and declines stepwise at the end of predefined intervals. Under the new system, benefits
remain at a fixed level for the whole payment period. Second, the new system introduces
a range of active labor market policy measures. This includes compulsory meetings on a
regular basis with a caseworker. At the first meeting, a personal plan called Plan d’Action
Personalise´ (PAP) is established. This captures in a contract the details about the degree of
assistance provided by the caseworker to the unemployed as well as the targeted job type
and the region of search. This contract is updated periodically if the individual remains
unemployed, typically every six months. During the first meeting the unemployed is
also assigned to one of different types of services such as counseling and training, see
Freyssinet (2002) for a detailed description of the reform.
The PARE reform has two distinguishing features. First, individuals whose unemploy-
ment spells started before the implementation of the reform and were still unemployed
during its commencement were given the option to choose whether they want to stay
in the AUD regime or switch to PARE. If an unemployed decides to stay in AUD, his
benefits payments continue to follow the decline scheme and no further changes of the
status quo take place. If an unemployed individual decides to switch to PARE, his benefit
payments are fixed at the latest level paid and no further decline occurs until the end of
the payment period (or unemployment exit). The individuals indicate their decision per
mail. The choice option does not apply to spells starting after the 1st of July 2001, the day
of coming into force of PARE. All new unemployed are automatically assigned to the new
system.
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The second distinguishing feature of the new system is that although the meetings with
the case worker were mandatory, there was no actual monitoring of the job search efforts.
Furthermore, the individuals could generally refuse to take part in assigned training or
counseling measures without incurring any sanctions. Thus, a relative attractiveness of
the benefits level in PARE is not counterbalanced by an increase in monitoring.
Ex ante it is not clear what the overall effect of the reform is. On the one hand, abolish-
ing the benefits decline removes an incentive for a high search effort. Therefore it can be
expected that the exit rate from unemployment to employment will decrease. This intu-
ition is incorporated in theoretical models on optimal unemployment insurance design,
see e. g. Pavoni and Violante (2007). There is also some empirical evidence for this in the
French context, for example in Prieto (2000) and Dormont et al. (2001). These papers use
a parametric specification (of PH and MPH models, respectively) to compare the French
unemployment insurance system from 1986-1992, which is characterized by a single drop
in benefits, with its successor, the AUD system with stepwise declines. However, Le Bar-
banchon (2012) finds no effect of a prolonged potential duration of the unemployment
payments on exit out of unemployment. He uses15 a regression discontinuity design, with
past employment duration as a forcing variable.
On the other hand, increased usage of active labor market policy measures is supposed
to increase the exit rate to employment. A vast body of empirical literature investigates
the effects of training, counseling and subsidized wages on the employment dynamics;
see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999) and Kluve (2010) for overviews. Job search assistance often
has a small to modest positive impact on the exit rate to work. Cre´pon et al. (2005) find a
significantly positive impact of counseling on the exit rate to unemployment in France.
3.2. The data. The data sample we use is taken from a matching of two administrative
data sets: the Fichier Historique (FH) data set, which contains information about the
unemployment spells and is issued by the French public employment agency (Agence
nationale pour l’emploi, ANPE), and the De´claration Anuelle de Donne´es Sociales (DADS)
data set, which contains the employment information of all individuals employed in the
private sector and is issued by the French Statistical Institute (INSEE). We extract a set
of variables, rich enough to account for the socio-economic status of the individuals
,namely age, gender, marital status, number of children, educational level, professional
experience, description of the job position/type in the last employment spell, reason
for entering unemployment, exit direction (out of unemployment), and unemployment
history. Details about the construction and content of the variables are in Appendix A.2.
To preclude geographical heterogeneity we restrict our sample to the administrative
region Iˆle de France, which contains Paris and consists of the administrative departments
75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95. Because of its size and specific infrastructure, this region
might differ from the rest of France in terms of labor market dynamics (mobility, unem-
ployment structure, wages) and in terms of the implementation of the reform. Moreover,
the macroeconomic conditions in this region are stable over the period of consideration,
which ensures the comparability of the cohorts, see subsection 3.4.
15The data set we use in this paper is a subset of the data used in Le Barbanchon (2012).
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The choice of the cohorts is restricted by the available data. There is no administrative
variable that captures the compliance status of the unemployed. Moreover, for budgetary
reasons and due to capacity constraints, there was time variation in the elapsed duration
at which the caseworker interview and other job search assistance measures took place
for those exposed to the new regime. Thus, some individuals might have exited the
state of unemployment before those events. We develop a novel approach to deal with
this problem, which so far has not been adopted in other PARE evaluation studies with
register data. Specifically, we choose the younger (i.e., treated) cohort {Z = t} such that its
first due benefits reduction under AUD coincides with the start of the reform exposure.
This enables us to observe the compliance status.16 Its inflow is six months before the
start of PARE.17 The choice of the comparison cohort (the untreated) is more flexible as
we do not need to observe the compliance. The main concerns are macroeconomic: a
good choice of a cohort does not violate the randomization assumption. Business cycles
or mass layoffs due to bankruptcies of large firms are examples for possible causes for
structural changes in the distribution of heterogeneity in the unemployment inflow over
time. We choose the comparison cohort to have entered unemployment 3 months earlier
than the treated cohort because then both cohorts begin their unemployment spells in a
fairly economically stable time interval; see subsection 3.4 for a discussion. This choice
has an implication for the time interval of comparison. Conditional on survival up to 6
months, one can compare the two cohorts only in an interval of 3 months. After the 3rd
month, the older cohort will also receive the treatment, and one would no longer compare
treated with untreated.
With these choices we end up with 537 (311) spells in the treated (comparison) cohort.
From these, 116 (76) are censored. In the treated cohort there are 250 compliers.
3.3. Estimation results. We now turn to our main results. With the choice of cohorts
described in section 3.2, the treatment effect which we estimate is equal to
(3.1) TE(6, a) = P(T(6) ∈ [6,6 + a) ∣ T(6) ≥ 6) − P(T(9) ∈ [6,6 + a) ∣ T(9) ≥ 6),
where a varies between 0 and 3 months. The upper limit three months follows from the
time difference of the inflows of the two cohorts. Any comparison beyond this interval
would involve two treated groups. The treatment effect gives thus the difference in the
probabilities to find a job in the interval [6,6+ a), conditionally on surviving up to the 6th
month, between the old and the new system. Letting a go to 0 gives the average causal
effect on the hazard rate.
The result is shown on figure 1. On the x-axis time is measured in days. Each (x, y)-point
represents a pair (a,ATE(a)). The estimated treatment effect is positive and increasing
16One may also consider subsequent elapsed durations at which declines take place, but this would be
at the cost of having fewer observations.
17The time length from inflow until the day of the first decline can vary somewhat, depending on
characteristics of the unemployed, such as number of working days in the last twelve months and age; see
Freyssinet (2002) for details. We stop the duration clock on days on which the individual worked part-time
during their unemployment spell. Excluding them instead does not affect the results. We exclude elderly
unemployed for whom the time length differs from 6 months.
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Figure 1. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
which indicates that the program was effective. The results are similar for different sub-
populations, see figures 2a and 2b. Overall, our results are compatible with the findings
(a) White vs Blue col-
lar (dashed)
(b) Low vs High edu-
cated (dashed)
Figure 2. Estimates conditional on qualification and education
in the existing literature on the effect of the PARE reform. Fouge`re et al. (2010) find a
positive and significant effect of the reform on the return to employment. They specify
the assignment of individuals to treatment types (conditional on being in the new re-
form) as a discrete choice, and the duration of unemployment as a MPH model. In their
analysis, they use spells beginning before and after the day of the reform. Debauche and
Jugnot (2007) does not find any evidence that the PARE program accelerates the return
to employment. Similarly to Fouge`re et al. (2010), they use both spells beginning before
and after the begin of the reform. For their analysis, they use a nonparametric Kaplan-
Meier estimator and simulated Cox-Model, and point out that the effect of the reform
on the unemployment hazard cannot be clearly separated from changes in the macroe-
conomic conditions. Further, Cre´pon et al. (2012) find that training does not accelerate
exit out of unemployment but increases the length of the subsequent employment spell.
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They utilise the (semi-) parametric framework of the timing-of-event method. They use
all spells with inflow between 2001 and 2005. The authors’ finding is related to the idea
that training increases human capital and improves matching process between firms and
unemployed. Next, Cre´pon et al. (2005) find that three out four counselling schemes have
a positive effect on the unemployment hazard.18 One possibility is that jointly these two
types of services offset the negative impact of the generous benefit system. Another pos-
sibility is that the financial side of the reform has little or no stimulus on the behaviour
of the individuals. Evidence for this possibility is provided by the study of the French
unemployment system in Le Barbanchon (2012). He finds no negative effect of the longer
potential duration of benefits on the exit out of unemployment using data for the period
2000-2002.
Remark: it must be noted that our evaluation subsumes several different treatments
into one single treatment. We interpret our evaluation as averaging over the different
treatment schemes. Furthermore, even if there was no real monitoring, it is likely that
the regular meetings with the caseworker were perceived as monitoring. Averaging over
different treatment types is not uncommon in the literature, see for example Blundell et al.
(2004) and Van den Berg et al. (2014) for evaluations of the New Deal for Young People
program in the UK.
3.4. The validity of the assumptions. We start with the randomization assumption A3.
Since T(s),S(t) and V are in general unobserved, A3 cannot be tested directly. However,
we may verify that the cohorts are similar at their inflows in terms of
(1) the distributions of the individual observed characteristics,
(2) the layoff reasons and
(3) the macroeconomic conditions
These comparisons provide indirect evidence for A3. We first perform a chi-square test for
equality of distributions of level of education, years of experience, number of children and
gender. The corresponding p-values are 0.6037, 0.98, 0.5112 and 0.581, which indicates that
the differences between these distributions are statistically insignificant. This is reflected
in their histograms, see figures 3a - 6b. Second, the same test is performed also for the layoff
reasons. The null (equality of distributions) is rejected, but in this case this could be due
to the large number of categories and small number of observations in each category. A
histogram of aggregated categories indicates that the cohorts are indeed similar, see figure
7a-7b. Third, the next we show the average level of unemployment in the administrative
region Iˆll de France in the first three quarters of 2001 is constant and equal to 6.4%, which
is evidence for a fairly stable macroeconomic environment19.
Next, the “no anticipation” assumption is fulfilled when individuals do not anticipate
the moment in time of treatment or do not act upon this information, see for a discussion
Abbring and van den Berg (2003). Although it was known that a reform is going to
take place, there was a lot of debate and uncertainty over its content. Unemployed were
18Similarly to the other related papers, this study estimates a MPH model for the hazard of unemploy-
ment. Only spells that begin after the reform are taken into consideration.
19Source: http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-donnees/bsweb
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(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 3. Histograms level of education
(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 4. Histograms level of qualification
informed about the exact content and launch date on the 18th of June 2001, that is,
less than two weeks before the start of the program, so they had practically no time to
react upon this information, see Freyssinet (2002). Further, when an individual decides
to switch to the new system, the assignment to a specific treatment depends mostly on
the social worker in charge and on the slots available, so that the unemployed has no
knowledge of it in advance, see also Cre´pon et al. (2005). Combined with a very short
time span between assignment and launch of a treatment is very short, which precludes
acting upon the anticipation.
The last important assumption is that of independent censoring. It cannot be tested di-
rectly, as revealed by a nonidentification result of Tsiatis (1975). Over 70% of all censored
spells are attributed to the censoring categories “no control”, “other cases” and “other
termination of search”. There is no further information for these cases. In subsection 3.6,
we conduct a simulation study, in which plausible deviations from the independence as-
sumptions are generated. It turns out that the estimator is robust towards such violations.
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(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 5. Histograms of years of experience
(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 6. Histograms of number of children
Remark: one implicit implication of the assumptions A2 and A4 is that noncompliers
who refuse the treatment behave in the same way as if they were not assigned to the
treatment. It is plausible, particularly in the cases in which individuals do not comply
in order not to change their behavior. In the PARE reform, it is plausible to assume that
individuals do not comply because they anticipate a fast exit and because they want to
avoid higher search effort or other related participation costs; see the next subsection for
an analysis of noncompliance. In both cases, assignment to the treatment together with a
selection out of it is not likely to change their behavior.
In sum, the assumptions adopted for identification and estimation of the treatment
effect of the PARE reform can be considered as plausible.
3.5. Analysis of endogeneity. In this subsection we tackle the static endogeneity issue
arising from noncompliance. Noncompliance is important not only for the evaluation
of a program but also in the light of its effectiveness. The non take-up of a policy often
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(a) Treated (b) Untreated
Figure 7. Histograms of layoff reasons
reduces the effectiveness of a program, see e. g. Blasco (2009). It is therefore important to
understand what drives noncompliance.
We start with an estimation of the naive treatment effect (2.8). The corresponding
estimator is defined as
(3.2) N̂E(t, a) ∶= P̂(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ S = t,Z = t) − P̂(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ S =∞,Z = t),
where t is equal to 6 months and a varies between 1 day and 3 months and the separate
probabilities are estimated with a Kaplan-Meier estimator. (3.2) amounts to a direct com-
parison of the average outcome of compliers and noncompliers from the cohort {Z = 6}.
The estimate is shown in figure 8. It is positive and increasing until the 80th day after
Figure 8. A naive estimator: noncompliers as control group. Time measured
in days.
treatment (which is the 260th day of unemployment), and then slightly decreasing. At the
first 40 days after treatment the effect is practically zero, at its maximum it is around 0.08,
and at day 60 after treatment (that is, after 8 months of unemployment) around 0.025. This
implies that the probability for a complier to find a job before the end of the first month
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after treatment, conditional on having been unemployed for 6 months, is almost the same
as for a noncomplier, before the end of the second month it is with 2.5 percentage points
higher, and at its peak it is 8 pp. higher.20 As a result, if we evaluate PARE using the
naive estimator (3.2), we would conclude that the reform was beneficial for the duration
of unemployment but that the effect is rather modest.
Using the methods developed in section 2.5, we answer now the following questions:● Is the non take-up of PARE driven by an endogenous selection?● If yes, in which direction is the bias of the naive estimator caused by this endoge-
nous selection?
To answer the first question, we perform the simplified test for exogeneity from section
2.5. The null hypothesis is
(3.3) H0 ∶ F¯1(6 ∣ S =∞) − F¯2(6).
It amounts to comparing the survival function at t = 6 of the noncompliers from cohort{Z = 6} with the survival function at t = 6 of the whole cohort {Z = 9}. The test statistics is
defined as T = ̂¯F1(T > 6 ∣ S =∞)− ̂¯F2(6), where ̂¯Fi, i = 1,2 are the Kaplan-Meier estimators
of F¯i.
The test rejects the null at 5 % level. As a result, untreated compliers and noncompliers
are significantly different in terms of potential outcomes, which induces a static selection
bias in the naive estimator. To evaluate the bias of (3.2), we plot T̂E(6, a) and N̂E(6, a)
for a varying between 0 and 3 months. The result is shown in figure 9. N̂E(6, a) has a
Figure 9. Comparison of the IV estimator (red line) and the naive estimator
(black line). Time measured in days
negative bias for all a. To find the reason for this negative bias, it is helpful to interpret it
in the frame of existing studies on policy take-up, see e.g. Moffit (1983), Currie (2004) and
Blasco (2009). An empirical analysis of the take-up of the PARE reform is done by Blasco
(2009), who also uses a theoretical model. She finds stigma, informational issues and the
20Controlling for observed covariates such as gender, education and type of job (white vs. blue collar)
yields similar results, see figures 14, 16a and 16b in appendix A.3. Due to the small sample size available,
we conduct the study mainly unconditionally.
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expectation of a soon exit to be the main reasons for noncompliance. One explanation
for the negative bias in line with Blasco (2009) would be therefore the expectation of a
short spell among noncompliers. Individuals who anticipate to find quickly a job or who
have even already signed a contract at the time of the reform start would be reluctant to
comply since they wouldn’t benefit from the generosity of the new program. Thus, there
is a selection of quick exits into the group of noncompliers which leads to the negative
bias of the naive estimator.
3.6. Dependent Censoring: a Simulation Study. To assess the impact of the assumption
of independent censoring, a small simulation study is conducted. Deviations from C ⊥ S
and C ⊥ T are constructed, where C again is a censoring random variable. The first one
influences the estimator of the probability to be a complier,
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t),
while the second one influences the estimator of the difference
P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′).
We are interested in their marginal impacts as well as in the influence of their interplay.
Two cohorts are simulated, the treated and the nontreated, each with 10000 individuals.
Both cohorts consist of compliers and noncompliers and in each cohort the probability to
be a complier is 80%. Noncompliers dominate stochastically the compliers when both
groups have not received the treatment. This reflects our finding in section 3.5 that
noncompliance might occur due to the expectation of a short spell. The treatment is
obtained by the compliers of the first cohort on the 20th day after inflow and it shifts their
duration distribution from N(60,15) to N(30,10) in line with the estimation results from
section 3.321. The noncompliers are not influenced by the treatment and have a duration
distribution N(45,15). The compliers from the second cohort do not receive the treatment
too. Their duration distribution is equal to the duration distribution of the compliers
of cohort 1 before treatment, N(60,15). Figure 10 shows the theoretical treatment effect,
Figure 10. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20).
21Negative values are replaced by their absolute values.
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depicted by the thick black line. The dashed red line represents the IV estimator in a
case with independent censoring with a distribution N(40,10) (the second argument is
henceforth the standard deviation) . This is the benchmark estimator.
Next, a dependence of the censoring on the compliance is introduced. The different
choices of distributions are described in table 1.
Table 1. Simulation of dependences between censoring and compliance
Line description Censoring distribu-
tion compliers
Censoring distribu-
tion noncompliers
Green dashed line N(30,15) N(50,15)
Red dotted line N(30,15) N(40,15)
Blue long dashed line N(40,15) N(30,15)
Grey two dashed line N(50,15) N(30,15)
Notes: The second argument of the normal distribution is its standard deviation
The resulting estimators are shown in figure 11. The solid black line is theoretical effect.
The figure reveals the relationship between bias of the treatment effect and dependence
Figure 11. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20). The black solid line
is the theoretical treatment effect. Different curves correspond to different
dependences of censoring and compliance, see table 1. The solid black line
is theoretical effect.
of censoring and compliance. When the compliers are at higher risk of censoring, the
treatment effect is (a. e.) underestimated. The higher this discrepancy in the risk exposure,
the bigger the bias. Similarly, when the noncompliers are at higher risk of censoring, the
treatment effect is overestimated.
Next, the relationship between bias and time dependence of the censoring is exploited.
We simulate three different levels of dependence. In all three cases long spells have a higher
risk of being censored than short spells. This is in line with typical situations in applied
survival analysis. For example, long term unemployed might have smaller incentives to
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meet criteria (e. g. administrative control of search, regular visits at the agency, etc.) to
stay on an unemployment insurance list. The three specifications are defined in table 2.
Each row represents one specification.
Table 2. Simulation of dependences between censoring and time
Line description Censoring distribu-
tion T ≤ 40 Censoring distribu-tion T > 40
Green dashed line N(40,20) N(30,20)
Red dotted line N(40,20) N(25,20)
Blue long dashed line N(40,20) N(20,20)
Notes: The second argument of the normal distribution is its standard deviation
The corresponding estimators are depicted in figure 12. Approximately until day 15
the IV estimator performs fairly well in all three cases. Afterwards it underestimates the
treatment effect. The bias increases in absolute value with increasing time dependence
(defined as the difference in the means in the two groups of spells).
Figure 12. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20).The black solid line
is the theoretical treatment effect. Different curves correspond to different
dependences of censoring and time, see table 2. The solid black line is
theoretical effect.
It is interesting to simulate and analyze a combination of these two types dependences.
We simulate four patterns of such an interplay. The concrete distributions are described
in table 3. The results are shown in figure 13. The blue and the grey lines are closer to
the theoretical effect than the other two estimators. This indicates, that a violation in the
censoring assumption C ⊥ S might partially offset a violation in the assumption C ⊥ T.
This is a novel result.
In the French labor market reform it is difficult to argue which type of dependence
there is likely to be. Noncompliers contain many quick exits, and if longer spells have a
higher censoring risk than shorter spells, than noncompliers should be less exposed to
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Table 3. Simulation of dependences between censoring and compliance
and time
Line description K, T ≤ 30 K, T > 30 N, T ≤ 30 N, T ≤ 30
Green dashed line N(50,20) N(30,20) N(30,20) N(20,20)
Red dotted line N(40,20) N(30,20) N(30,20) N(20,20)
Blue two dashed line N(30,20) N(20,20) N(40,20) N(30,20)
Grey long dashed line N(30,20) N(20,20) N(50,20) N(30,20)
Notes: K stays for compliers, N for noncompliers.
censoring than compliers. This would correspond to the fourth case of table 3. Thus the
simulation results provide evidence, that the IV estimator is robust to a violation in the
independent censoring assumption.
Figure 13. An IV estimator of the treatment effect. Time measured in days.
Day 0 corresponds to the day of treatment (day 20). The black solid line is the
theoretical effect in the absence of censoring. Different curves correspond
to different dependences of censoring and time, see table 2. The solid black
line is theoretical effect.
4. Summary and Discussion
In this paper we developed a nonparametric IV framework for the evaluation of dy-
namic treatment effects. Our methods solve the problems of dynamic and static endogene-
ity and allow for censoring. The corresponding estimators have a natural interpretation
and are related to the Wald-type statistics. We also suggest a framework for analysis of
noncompliance. We used our methods to evaluate the French labor market reform PARE.
The estimated effect of the reform on the conditional survival function of the unemploy-
ment variable is positive, which is in line with the findings in the existing literature. In
an exhaustive study, we showed that the assumptions for our approach are valid. Our
results reveal that neglecting of endogeneity would lead to a negative bias. An interesting
question for future research would be to incorporate equilibrium effects. Comprehensive
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policy reforms are likely to induce equilibrium effects through positive or negative exter-
nalities. It is often desirable to distinguish between the direct effects of a reform and the
equilibrium effects. More work on this topic has to be done.
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Appendix A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs of propositions. Proof of Proposition 2.1
First we show that from the no anticipation assumption the following result holds:
(A.1) P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t).
This is so because
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) = exp(−ΘT(t)(t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V))
No anticipation= exp(−ΘT(t′)(t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V)) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V),
so that we obtain
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = IE [I{T(t)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t]= IE [IE [I{T(t)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t,V] ∣ X,S(t) = t]= IE [P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) ∣ X,S(t) = t]= IE [P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) ∣ X,S(t) = t]= IE [IE [I{T(t′)≥t} ∣ X,S(t) = t,V] ∣ X,S(t) = t] = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t)
where I{T(s)∈B} is an indicator function equal to 1 when T(s) ∈ B (of course from these steps
we also see that P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V) = P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V)).
Next, using result (A.1), we show FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T(t′)≥t,X,S(t)=t. Let B be a Borel set.
With result (A.1), it holds
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).
Now we show FV∣T(t)≥t,X,S(t)=t = FV∣T≥t,X,S=t,Z=t. First we observe that Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X,V
and Z y V ∣ X together imply Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X (Weak Union, see Pearl (2000)). Then,
we have
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t)P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V ∈ B)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) .
We study the separate components of the right-hand side of the last expression.
(1) With assumptions A3 and A4, it holds
P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t).
(2) Further,
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t,V ∈ B) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,V ∈ B,Z = t).
(3) Using Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X instead of Z y {T(s),S(z)} ∣ X,V, we obtain
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)
So finally we get the equality
P(V ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
= P(V ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,V ∈ B,Z = t)
P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t)= P(V ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t)
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Proof of corollary 2.1
With proposition 2.1,
TE(t, t′, a) = IE[P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t]
− IE[P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,V,S(t) = t) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t]= P(T(t) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) − P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t).
Lemma A.1. Set B = [t, t + a) where a ≤ t′ − t. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 that
(A.2)
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t),
(A.3)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) =∞) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S =∞,Z = t) and
(A.4)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′).
Proof
First, observe that with randomization and consistency, it holds
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ X,S = t,Z = t),
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X,S(t) = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ X,S = t,Z = t),
so that
P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) = P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,S = t,Z = t)
where the r.h.s of the equality consists only of observables.
Next, we have
P(T ∈ B ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t) = P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S =∞,Z = t)= P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞,Z = t) = P(T(∞) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞)= P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ X,S(t) =∞),
where the first and the second equalities follow due to consistency, the third due to
randomisation and the fourth due to no anticipation. Equality (A.4) follows analogically.
Lemma A.2. Under Assumptions A1-A4, it holds for all ∞ ≥ t′ ≥ t ≥ 0 that
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X) = P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t),(A.5)
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X).(A.6)
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Proof
First, it holds
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) = P(T ≥ t ∣ S = t,X,Z = t)P(S = t ∣ X,Z = t)
P(T ≥ t ∣ X,Z = t)
= P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X) = P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X),
where the second equality follows with assumptions A1-A4.
Next,
P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X) = P(S(t) = t,T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X)
P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ X)
= P(T(t′) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)
P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X) = P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ S(t) = t,X)P(S(t) = t ∣ X)P(T(t) ≥ t ∣ X)= P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X),
where the second equality holds due to no anticipation.
Proof of proposition 2.2
First, write
P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X)(A.7) = P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)P(S(t) = t ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X)+ P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) =∞)P(S(t) =∞ ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X),
and then express P(T(t′) ∈ [t, t + a) ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t) in terms of the other three
components of equality (A.7). Plugging in the results of lemma A.1 and lemma A.2, we
obtain for FC,0 ∶= P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
P(T(t′) ∈ B ∣ T(t′) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t)
= P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′) − P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t,S =∞)P(S =∞ ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) .
Finally, with FC,1 ∶= P(T(t) ∈ B ∣ T(t) ≥ t,X,S(t) = t), the treatment effect is equal to FC,1−FC,0
which after simplification is equal to
P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) − P(T ∈ B ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t′)
P(S = t ∣ T ≥ t,X,Z = t) . ◻
Proof of proposition 2.7
For notational simplicity we drop the dependence on 0 and x0. First note, that the results
of Theorem 1 Nielsen and Linton (1995) remain valid at the boundary when we replace
the symmetric kernel k with its boundary counterpart k+ and adapt the constants. The
validity of proposition 2.7 i) follows from
√
nbq+1((Ψ̂−Ψ∗) = √nbq+1p̂1 ((θ̂1 −θ∗1)− (θ̂2 −θ∗2)),
the independence of (θ̂1 − θ∗1) and (θ̂2 − θ∗2), and the adapted proof of Theorem 1 i) in
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Nielsen and Linton (1995). Next, it holds
(A.8) b−2(Ψ∗ −Ψ) = b−2
p̂1
((θ∗1 − θ1) − (θ∗2 − θ2)) + b−2(θ1 − θ2)( 1p̂1 − 1p1 ).
The second term on the right-hand side of (A.8) is equal to op(1) when b is of order
O(n−1/(q+5)) or o(n−1/(q+5)). Proposition 2.7 ii) follows with Theorem 1 b) in Nielsen and
Linton (1995). Finally, proposition 2.7 iii) follows directly from the adapted proof of
Theorem 1 c) Nielsen and Linton (1995) and the continuous mapping theorem.
A.2. Description of variables. The variables used in our application have been con-
structed in the following way:● The variable age gives the age at the begin of the unemployment spell and is
defined as the year in which the spells begins minus the year of birth.● Marital status consists of four categories: single, married, divorced and widowed.● the variable for educational level summarizes the 31 categories used in the ad-
ministrative data set into 6 categories according to the highest degree attained.
The correspondence is roughly as follows: value 1 if the degree is in niveau I and II
(university degree, maıˆtrise and licence), value 2 if the degree is in niveau III - BTS
and DUT (brevet de technicier supe´rieur and diploˆme univeritaire de technologie,
respectively, both technical degrees obtained in 2 years after high school), value 3
for all Baccalaure´at (high school degree, the general part of lyce´e) diplomas and
for all dropouts from niveau III, 4 for all BEP ,CEP (professional Baccalaure´at,
specialised part of lyce´e) and all dropouts from Baccalaure´at, 5 for BEPC (brevet
d’e´tudes du premier cycle, junior high school), and 6 for below.● The variable experience states the number of years of experience in the job (type
and position), which the individual is looking for. The types of jobs are specified
in an administrative nomenclature table (ROME table). There are several hundred
different types.● The job type variable contains general information about the type of the activity
in the job preceding the current unemployment spell. It summarizes the 9 admin-
istrative categories into 6 categories: white collar skilled, white collar unskilled,
technical, supervisor (a production team leader) and manager. This summarized
categorization is in line with existing literature, see for example Cre´pon et al.
(2010). The initial administrative variable is contained in the FH data set. This
holds also for the variable, which states which job is the unemployed looking for,
while the following employment type and position is contained in the DADS data
set. Unfortunately, there is no clear matching between the variables from the two
different data sets, which leads to some unclarity regarding the question whether
the unemployed actually found the job he/she was looking for. This restricts our
definition of censoring. Therefore, in this application each observation with known
job destination is considered uncensored.● Censoring indicator: there are several possibilities, when an observation is con-
sidered as censored. These are:
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– when the unemployment spell in the data set is not finished at the time of the
data collection, or
– when the individual exits the labor market. This includes exits to maternity,
accident, illness or invalidity, invalidity pension, military service, administra-
tive change of insurance status, attrition because of insufficient administrative
control, dropout because of irregular notifications, and other, unspecified rea-
sons. While reasons such as maternity, military services and invalidity pension
are normally known well in advance by the unemployed and can therefore be
related to search activity (as well as to compliance behavior), they represent a
small fraction of the observations.● Unemployment history: it is constructed as a binary variable which equals 1 if
the individual had been already unemployed before the last employment spell.
There are various ways to define unemployment history. One example is the total
length of previous unemployment spells. Alternatively, one could take the num-
ber of unemployment spells, or both. All possibilities suffer from disadvantages.
The last possibility seems to provide the most complete information, but it also
demands more data, since it provides many different categories. The total length
of previous unemployment lacks any information about the lengths of the sep-
arate spells, and the number of spells alone doesn’t give any information about
the length of unemployment. The binary indicator also does not provide any in-
formation at all about the dispersion of previous unemployment, but it is easy
to understand and requires only two categories, which makes it computationally
attractive. Additional, more serious drawback for the other two indicators is, that
the data set is left censored: the earliest information about employment is from
1993. This problem is less severe, if one only looks at the indicator of having been
unemployed.
A.3. Analysis of endogeneity.
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Figure 14. A naive estimator. Male vs. Female. Time measured in days.
Figure 15. A naive estimator for subgroups
(a) Education. Low ed-
ucated dashed line
(b) Qualification. Blue
collars dashed line
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